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The main justiﬁcation for cash-in-advance (CIA) equilibria when there are multiple
assets is a Shapley-Shubik trading-post model where the agents coordinate on a particular
medium of exchange. Of course, there are other equilibria. We introduce a reﬁnement and
show that the CIA equilibrium does not satisfy our reﬁnement while there exist equilibria
that do.
1 Introduction
The main rationale for cash-in-advance models when there are multiple assets seems to be a
Shapley-Shubik trading-post model and an equilibrium in that model with no activity at the
posts at which assets other than money can be traded for goods—or, at least, those goods
labelled cash goods. The notion that money has value only because it is the generally agreed
upon convention is old and is described by, for instance, Tobin [4]. Howitt [3] suggests that this
can also justify cash-in-advance equilibria in the trading post model. In a static Cournot-type
quantity game for the trading-post model, inactivity of any given post is a Nash equilibrium
because a single agent has no incentive to place quantity orders on an inactive post. Such
potential inactivity is the rationale for assuming that people cannot trade assets other than
money directly for some goods.
However, the fact that inactivity of any given post is a Nash equilibrium also implies that
no trade at all is a Nash equilibrium. In part to eliminate such equilibria, Dubey and Shubik
[1], in a static quantity-game version of the trading-post model, introduce a reﬁnement which
eliminates no trade: they assume that there are small exogenous oﬀers (given from the outside)
at each of their posts and say that an equilibrium satisﬁes the reﬁnement if it is a limit as those
exogenous oﬀers approach zero. Here, we apply a version of that reﬁnement to a trading-post
model with one perishable good per date, money, and a bond which dominates money in rate
¤This note owes its existence in no small measure to Prof. Neil Wallace who initially suggested the problem
and later provided invaluable support at every stage. Needless to say, the usual disclaimers apply.
1of return. Since analyzing the Cournot quantity game is diﬃcult in an inﬁnite-horizon setting,
we follow Hayashi and Matsui [2] and assume that the agents in the model take prices as given.
We show that there is no equilibrium satisfying the reﬁnement with activity at the post
at which money trades for the good (the money post). In other words, the cash-in-advance
equilibrium does not satisfy the reﬁnement. To show that there can be active trade equilibria
that satisfy the reﬁnement, we produce such an equilibrium for an example.
2 The Model
Time is discrete and there is one perishable, non produced good at each date. There are N
inﬁnitely lived agents who maximize discounted utility. Agent i has a discount factor ¯i 2 (0;1)
and a period utility (of consumption) function, ui : R+ ! R, which is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and continuously diﬀerentiable, and also satisﬁes u0(0) = 1. Agent i has
an endowment of the date t good denoted !i
t and starts date 1, the initial date, with some
money, denoted mi
0. The only other asset is a one-period nominal discount bond oﬀered by the
government.1 At the beginning of each date, each agent can buy bonds with money (only) at
an exogenously determined price q < 1. (At the end of the period, the bonds “mature,” which
will be taken to mean that they automatically turn into money at a one-for-one rate.) The
quantity of bonds bought by agent i at date t measured at maturity value in term of money is
denoted bi
t. After bond purchases, there is trade at Shapley-Shubik trading posts. There are
two such posts: at the money post (denoted M) money trades for date t good; at the bond post
(denoted B) bonds trade for the same good. Interest on bonds is ﬁnanced by a proportional
tax on end-of-period money holdings, a tax which is equivalent to ﬁnancing interest by money
creation. Our version of the Dubey-Shubik reﬁnement is that there is an exogenous positive
amount of the good, denoted ", oﬀered at each of the two trading posts at each date.
To deﬁne an equilibrium, we ﬁrst deﬁne what an agent can aﬀord. In the deﬁnition, we
denote the sequence (xt)1
1 by x:









































1As this suggests, there is no private borrowing and lending. One rationale is that people are anonymous.
2where ci
t is consumption, si
tB (si
tM) is the oﬀer of goods at the bond (money) post, di
tB (di
tM)











t, and Bt ´
P
i bi
t, an equilibrium can be
deﬁned as follows.




M) for each i;(pB;pM), and ¼ is an equilibrium
if (i) ci maximises i’s utility from among all consumption sequences aﬀordable at (pB;pM) and
¼, (ii) ptB = DtB=(StB + ") and ptM = DtM=(StM + ") and (iii) Mt¡1 = (1 ¡ ¼t)[(Mt¡1 ¡
qBt) + Bt ¡ "(ptM + ptB)].
Condition (ii) is market clearing at each post and condition (iii) requires that the tax rate
be such as to hold constant the quantity of money. We are interested in " = 0 equilibria that
are the limits of equilibria as " ! 0.
Deﬁnition 3. An " = 0 equilibrium satisﬁes the reﬁnement if it is a (point-wise) limit of "n
equilibria for any sequence ("n) # 0.
3 Results
The ﬁrst result is that a cash-in-advance equilibrium does not satisfy the reﬁnement.
Proposition 1. If q < 1 and ² > 0; then there is no equilibrium with StM > 0 (with some of
the good oﬀered at the money post).
Proof. The proof is a simple arbitrage argument, one which is consistent with the short-sales
constraints of the trading-post model and one which makes no appeal to the special assumptions
of the model. Suppose to the contrary that there is an equilibrium with StM > 0: If so, then
ptM > ptB (if not, then it is better to sell the good at the bond post) and ptM > 0 (if not, then
it is better to consume rather than oﬀer any of the good). The latter implies that DtM > 0:
But the former implies that any person whose oﬀer of money contributes to making DtM > 0
would do better by using that money to buy bonds and oﬀering the bonds at the bond post.
Hence, there is no such equilibrium.
We now show that the above proposition is not vacuous by producing an example which has
an active trade equilibrium that satisﬁes the reﬁnement. To do that, we need an example in
which there is a motivation for trade. A simple example is the alternating endowment economy
with identical preferences.
Example: N = 2, ¯i = ¯, ui = u, !1 = (yH;yL;yH;:::), !2 = (yL;yH;yL;:::), where yH > yL,
u0(yH)=[¯u0(yL)] < 1, and m1
0 = 0, m2
0 = 1.
Proposition 2. The example has an " = 0 equilibrium that satisﬁes the reﬁnement and that
has StB > 0:
Proof. The proof is constructive. And, as might be expected, a constant equilibrium is con-
structed. We start by constructing consumption. Let (cH(");cL(")) be the solution for (cH;cL)
to








(Notice that (1) is the resource constraint at equality and that (2) is the condition that a high
endowment person makes an optimal two-date saving decision from a linear budget set.) It is
obvious that (cH(");cL(")) exists, is unique, is continuous in " and that cH(") < yH and cL(") >
yL. Moreover, lim"!0(cH(");cL(")) = (cH(0);cL(0)); where
u0(cH(0))




¯ and cH(") > cL(").
A solution is depicted in Figure 1 below, for large ". The thick line represents what the agent
can aﬀord. Note that there is no credit in the economy. The pair (cH(");cL(")) is determined by
two conditions: an indiﬀerence curve is tangent at (cH(");cL(")) to a line through (cH(");cL("))
and (yH;yL) and (cH(");cL(")) satisﬁes the resource constraint with equality.
-
good t
















































































































































cH + cL = yH + yL
¾
u(yH) + ¯u(yL)
u(ct) + ¯u(ct+1) =
45±
Figure 1: Solution for cH(");cL(")
4We now construct prices, portfolios and oﬀers. For any " > 0, both DtB and DtM must be
positive. That implies that ptM = qptB. Using the fact that no goods are oﬀered at the money






yH ¡ cH(") + "
= qptB: (3)
Notice that the second equality is a linear equation in one unknown, Bt, which is to be in-
terpreted as the bond purchases at each date of the person with endowment yL: This gives
us candidates for all the equilibrium objects except the tax rate: it is obtained directly from
equilibrium condition (iii) and is constant.
By construction, the candidate satisﬁes equilibrium conditions (ii) and (iii). It remains to
verify that it satisﬁes individual optimization. The main step in doing that involves showing
that the gross real rate of return implied by (3) and the tax rate is equal to the righthand
side of (2). Goods can be sold for an after-tax price of (1 ¡ ¼)ptB and are purchased for qptB.
Therefore, the gross real rate of return is (1 ¡ ¼)=q: From equilibrium condition (iii),
q
1 ¡ ¼
= qBt ¡ q"ptB
=
qBt
yH ¡ cH(") + "





where the ﬁrst equality follows from the ﬁrst equality in (3), the second from the last equality
in (3), and the third from solving the second equality in (3) for qB and using (1). This implies
that the proposed prices and tax rates imply that people choose consumption facing a constant
gross real rate of return given by the right-hand side of (2), which for small enough " is less than
1=¯: It follows that the low endowment person wants to save 0 and that the high endowment
person wants to save yH ¡ cH("), exactly as proposed.
Notice that the real aspects of the equilibrium constructed for the example happen to be
the same as for a cash-in-advance equilibrium for q 2 (¯;1]: That is, if one simply shuts down
the bond post and if the discount on bonds is not too large, then no one buys bonds, the tax
rate is zero, and people face a gross real rate of return of unity. Needless to say, that is not
a justiﬁcation for shutting down the bond post. It should also be noted that this equilibrium
construction is essentially the same as the equilibrium of the so-called “turnpike model” in
Townsend [5].
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